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Abstract:
In many modem democracies, the leaders who make important influential 
political decisions are highly likely to be party politicians or indeed party leaders. 
Very often they cannot prepare an adequate strategy for their political parties 
because it is usually impossible to find out all necessary elements for projecting the 
goals. It is not surprising that political parties are the most important organizations 
in modem politics and in the contemporary world, only a few states do without 
them. The reason that political parties are well-nigh ubiquitous is that they perform 
functions that are valuable to many political actors. Political parties play a major role 
in the recruitment o f top politicians, on whom the momentous and painful political 
decisions often fall. With very few exceptions, political chief executives are elected 
on the slate o f some established political party, and very often the head o f govern­
ment continues to serve as the head of the political party that propelled him or her 
into office. Democracy may be conceived as a process by which voters delegate 
policy-making authority to a set o f representatives, and political parties are the main 
organizational vehicle by which such delegation takes place. The main aim of this 
article is focus on the minority government, which are especially common in the 
Scandinavian countries. They can be more easily formed and maintained where the 
party system makes it difficult to secure support for an alternative majority coali­
tion to be formed, a vote of investiture is not required, and a government can stay 
in office unless there is an absolute majority against it. In the article will be empha­
sized some case studies o f Denmark minority government formation and durability. 
General findings will be confronted with empirical data, which will allow to formu­
late conclusions about the specific o f minority cabinet in Denmark.
Key words:
party leaders, minority government, coalition, Nordic States, Denmark, party 
behavior, elections, majority, parliamentary members
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Introduction
In many modem democracies, the leaders who make important influen­
tial political decisions are highly likely to be party politicians or indeed party 
leaders. Very often they cannot prepare an adequate strategy for their political 
parties because it is usually impossible to find out all necessary elements for 
projecting the goals. It is not surprising that political parties are the most impor­
tant organizations in modem politics and in the contemporary world, only a few 
states do without them. The reason that political parties are well-nigh ubiqu­
itous is that they perform functions that are valuable to many political actors. 
Political parties play a major role in the recruitment o f top politicians, on whom 
the momentous and painful political decisions often fall. With very few excep­
tions, political chief executives are elected on the slate o f some established poli­
tical party, and very often the head of government continues to serve as the head 
o f the political party that propelled him or her into office. Democracy may be 
conceived as a process by which voters delegate policy-making authority to a set 
o f representatives, and political parties are the main organizational vehicle by 
which such delegation takes place [Strom, Müller 1999: 1]
The great significance o f parties in m odem  democracies is such that 
observers in many countries have spoken o f partocracy, or even party govern­
ment. Some o f experienced scientists define party government as involving the 
following conditions [Katz 1986: 31-71]:
(1)Govemment decisions are made by elected party officials or by those 
under their control.
(2)Govemment policy is decided within political parties.
(3)These parties then act cohesively to enact and implement this policy.
(4)Public officials are recruited through political parties.
(5)Public officials are held accountable through political parties.
After analyzing such conditions we can understand that under party
government, parties serve to organize policy making in government (points 1, 
2, and 3), they function as devices through which voters can make their voices 
heard (point 5), and they control the recruitment o f political personnel (point 4). 
It also can be defined differently by explaining the role o f party in government, 
party in the electorate and party organization.
The consequence o f such division o f aims may help us to clarify three 
main fundamental democratic processes mentioned by John H. Aldrich [1995]: 
the selection o f candidates, the mobilization o f voters, and the achievement o f 
relatively stable legislative majorities. Because parties still perform important 
political functions, one o f the crucial questions to be asked is about the role of 
parties in representative democracy? What conditions do parties have to meet to
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serve as useful vehicles o f representation? According to the anti-elitist theories 
o f democracy, true representative democracy requires, at the very least, inter­
nally democratic political parties.
Party leaders must be accountable to their rank and file and serve as their 
delegates rather than as trustees. That is to say, they should regard themselves 
as speaking for their constituents and voting as their constituents would have 
wanted. It is well known that democracy requires that citizens remain sovereign 
and capable o f instructing their elected officials. In the view o f some anti-elitists, 
true democracy may even require the absence o f leadership and hierarchy. 
As Robert Michels [1962: 364] puts it, “every system o f leadership is incompa­
tible with the most essential postulates o f democracy”. Representative demo­
cracy, then, is attainable only if  “the iron law of oligarchy” within parties can be 
counteracted or at least contained. The classical formulation prepared by Joseph 
Schumpeter, defines democracy as the “competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote”. The role o f the people is simply to “produce a government” [Schumpeter 
1943: 269], and Schumpeter shows no concern with the internal democracy of 
the organizations that guarantee popular rule. In Giovanni Sartori’s interpreta­
tion, the Schumpeterian model implies that “large-scale democracy is not an 
enlargement or a sheer adding up o f many ‘little democracies’” [Sartori 1987: 
152], William Riker, who essentially stands in the same tradition, argues that 
“the function o f voting is to control officials, and no more” [Riker 1982: 9],
According to above mentioned traditions a representational role o f demo­
cratic political parties may be described in two ways. In the first tradition, called 
by Riker “populist”, parties should faithfully represent the policy preferences 
o f their members and followers. In the second model, named “liberal”, parties 
should maximize their opportunities to gain office, whether or not the positions 
they take correspond to the policy preferences o f their members. Under specific 
circumstances, that might mean maximizing their expected number o f votes. 
For many observers o f political life it is extremely interesting how party leaders 
choose between different objectives and how such decisions are constrained 
[Strom, Muller 1999: 4],
To sum up, a great num ber o f researchers agrees that among models 
o f competitive party behaviors we can see that parties have a small and well­
-defined set o f objectives, classified into: office-seeking (1), policy-seeking
(2) and vote-seeking model.
In this context it is obvious that party leaders rarely have the opportunity 
to realize all o f their goals simultaneously. Sometimes one chosen behavior that 
maximizes one o f their objectives may not lead to the best possible outcome 
with respect to the others. In some other cases, policy pursuit may conflict 
with a party’s ability to capture office. When parties bargain over participation
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in a new government coalition, for example, they may often be asked to resign 
from their policy preferences in order to gain seats at the cabinet table. In order 
to find coalition partners, party leaders may need to dilute their policy commit­
ments and thus potentially antagonize their own activists. During the lifetime 
o f a coalition in which parties have had to make such compromises, policy 
conflicts may emerge time and again -  for example, at the time o f national party 
conferences, when delegates may seek to pressure party leaders into a renegotia­
tion o f coalition policies. In other cases, the profits o f participating in a cabinet 
coalition may be likely to carry a price in future elections, so that the trade-off 
is between office and future electoral performance and is minimalized even by 
intraparty exchanges. Examples may be seen where party leaders conclude that 
the electoral losses they have suffered are too heavy tojustify continued govern­
ment participation. There is also a situation that insisting on particular policy 
preferences implies an electoral liability. This is often a trade-off party leaders 
face when they are drafting their electoral platform or manifesto. If  this platform 
contains everything that the hard-core activists want, then it will probably cause 
the party to fare poorly among the regular voters. On the other hand, an elec­
torally optimal platform may imply policy sacrifices that are hard for the party 
faithful to swallow [Strom, Muller 1999: 9-10],
Every conflict between the goals must be seen in the context o f time hori­
zons o f party leaders. For example electoral costs and benefits, typically are not 
realized immediately, so it is not surprising that party leaders concern themse­
lves with elections that lie a few months to a few years ahead. They seldom acti­
vely look beyond the next election in which they will be involved. Nevertheless, 
the time horizons o f politicians is dependent on the specific type o f party and 
may deeply affect the trade-offs and compromises they are willing to make.
As m any people believe the crucial m om ent o f  conversion o f votes 
into office and policy benefits depends on control o f elected office. Formal 
theories o f party behavior typically assume that government incumbency is at 
least a necessary, and possibly a sufficient, condition for both policy and office 
payoffs. However, this assumption clearly oversimplifies reality, because we 
can proof that parties not represented in government often have a significant 
impact on policy and may even share in office payoffs [Laver and Budge 1992; 
Strom 1984], In spite o f this still controlling the executive branch is the most 
important factor in this case and governing parties have greater access to policy 
influence and office benefits than the opposition. But the degree to which insti­
tutions favor incumbents varies.
These differentials depend partly on the particular government and partly 
on the political system as a whole. Under otherwise identical circumstances, 
a minority government likely would have to share policy influence (and perhaps
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spoils) with the opposition to a greater extent than would a majority administra­
tion. There are also systematic cross-national differences in the distribution o f 
these benefits. Some institutional arrangements favor governing parties more 
than others in the opposition. Let us think o f each polity as having a modal 
distribution o f office and policy influence between government and opposition. 
Thus, we can speak o f systemic office benefit differentials and policy influence 
differentials between governing and opposition parties. Office benefit differen­
tials refer to the typical distribution o f such goods (the perquisites o f office) 
between government and opposition. In some democracies (e.g., Westminster 
systems), the governing parties essentially monopolize such payoffs, whereas 
in others (e.g., consociational ones), even parties that are formally in opposition 
may be cut in on many o f these deals. The same holds with respect to policy 
benefit distributions. The office and policy benefit differentials, respectively, 
refer to the ex ante expectations among party leaders concerning the allocation 
o f these goods. These two types o f benefits may vary independently o f each 
other, and both may effectively be constant-sum in the short term. The greater 
the differential is with respect to each good, the greater the incentive for party 
leaders to pursue that objective. Thus, office pursuit should covary positively 
with office benefit differentials and policy pursuit correlate similarly with policy 
influence differentials. In sum, institutions (or rather, party leaders’ expecta­
tions concerning their effects) are likely to influence party behavior in a variety 
o f ways. The more predictably votes translate into intrinsically valued goods 
such as policy influence or office, the more slavishly party leaders will follow 
their electoral incentives. As we have seen, this conversion depends on many 
political rules or institutions. And the relative availability o f policy influence 
versus office benefits at the margin will determine the trade-offs party leaders 
make betweenthese goods [Strom, Muller 1999: 23-24],
Minority Governments’ Origin in Denmark and Other Nordic States
A parliamentary system is a system of government in which the members 
o f a legislative body determine the formation o f the cabinet (the executive) and 
in which any majority o f the legislature at almost any time may vote the cabinet 
out o f office. Thus, in any parliamentary system, legislative majorities have 
instruments at their disposal (such as no-confidence votes and investiture votes) 
they may use to control the composition o f the government and government 
policy. Still, m ajority governm ents are not always formed. In proportional 
parliamentary democracies, single parties only rarely win majorities, and coali­
tion formation becomes necessary [Laverand, Schofield 1990], The number of 
democracies in the world today is higher than in any other time. The majority
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of these democracies adopt a constitution that is based on assembly confidence. 
Assembly confidence regimes are those in which governments, in order to come 
to and stay in power, must be at least tolerated by a legislative majority. In some 
cases, the government is assumed to have the confidence o f the parliament as 
long as no majority expresses itself against it; in other cases, confidence exists 
only i f  a majority explicitly expresses its support for the government through 
voting. The former are cases usually referred to as negative parliamentarism; 
the latter, as positive parliamentarism.
No region has experienced minority governments more frequently than 
Scandinavia. In sharp contrast with Finland and Iceland, the Scandinavian coun­
tries o f Denmark, Sweden and Norway have had minority governments for more 
than two-thirds o f the post-W orld War II period. Single-party parliamentary 
majorities have not existed in Denmark almost since the beginning o f twen­
tieth century. Because making decisions in legislative and governmental affairs 
is obviously required in every political system, some kind of inter-party coope­
ration was created. When we look closely on Denmark policy after the II World 
War we can notice that majority coalition governments have been the excep­
tion rather than rule, as most governments have been o f minority type [Thomas 
1982], In the decade o f 1980s these minority governments has been supported 
by coalitions and it was a visible change with the comparison to previous decade 
when a single-party government dominated [Damgaard 1992],
After analyzing most o f European states it is clear that Denmark holds 
the post-war record in parliamentary democracies concerning minority govern­
m ents [M ukherjee, Leblang 2006: 452; Courtenay, Golder 2010: 119-150; 
A rm ingeon, W eisstanner, Engler, Poto lid is, Gerber, L eim gruber 2011], 
Such cabinets are facilitated by the negative formation rule practiced from the 
beginning o f twentieth century. As it was mentioned previously negative parlia­
mentarism means that a government does not need a positive vote o f confidence 
(investiture). On the one hand this model seems to be simple, but on the other 
hand Danish governm ent is obliged to resign or call elections i f  parliam ent 
adopts a motion o f no confidence. This mechanism imply that some parties 
may prefer minority than majority governments, as they can retain considerable 
political impact on a government and avoid potential cost o f formal participa­
tion in government. Generally, minority governments have to rely on ‘support’ 
parties to create a legislative majorities. Such external support for cabinet may 
be provided either ad hoc or on more permanent basis when government and 
its party may actually function together as a kind o f quasi-majority coalition 
government [Damgaard 2006: 231],
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During two decades -  1970s and 1980s -  all Danish governments were 
minority governments. According to statistic data seven out o f thirteen mino­
rity cabinets in the period from October 1971 to January 1993 consisted o f 
one party only, while six were minority coalition governments. I f  we try to 
count the months these governments were in office, we get an almost balanced 
picture: 47 per cent o f the months saw a single-party minority government and 
53 per cent a minority coalition government. That is why Denmark could be 
seen as a polity where both kinds o f minority governments did occur to almost 
the same degree, the single-party variant being dominant during the 1970s and 
minority coalitions during the 1980s. The four-party majority coalition installed 
in January 1993 commanded only 50.3 per cent o f the seats in parliament, and 
this only was a temporary deviation from the dominant pattern [Elklit 1999: 63],
In one o f  the m ost im portant m onographs Kaare Strom [1990: 89] 
presents some interesting conclusions concerned minority governments mecha­
nisms. He claims that associating minority cabinets with political instability, 
fractionalization, polarization and difficult formation processes is not true. 
It is even completely opposite situation and minority governments should be 
treated as consequences o f rational party behavior under conditions o f compe­
tition rather than conflict. Strom’s studies covers fifteen Western parliamentary 
democracies between the end o f World War II and 1987 and minority govern­
ments account for 35 per cent o f all cabinets formed. Denmark is looked upon 
as the extreme case, since only three o f the twenty-five governments during 
this period were not minority cabinets [Strom 1990: 59], Since 1987, Denmark 
has had four more minority cabinets (and one majority cabinet), changing the 
num ber to four o f thirty cabinets during the period 1945-97. The m inority 
government proportion is thus an impressive 87 per cent.
Among the researchers there is no general agreement on why minority 
governments form, and why they clearly are viable and stable cabinet solutions 
in some political systems. It is quite complicated task to explain why minority 
governments have been dominant in Scandinavia, while majority governments 
prevail in Finland and Iceland. It is even more interesting because, the polities 
o f the Nordic countries are similar, and some o f the differences clearly have no 
influence on government formation. Also it is worth noting that constitutional 
frameworks have been relatively stable over time in all Nordic countries, so it is 
difficult to trace the occurrence o f minority governments back to differences in 
constitutional details. The explanation for the Nordic patterns o f government 
formation is rather connected with the nature o f party systems in the region.
Theoretically, minority governments have been explained as the result of 
party fragmentation and polarisation. Some experts claimed that the first reason 
for this model was a gradual development o f multiparty legislatures and the
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reluctance to enter formal coalitions. Others stress that minority cabinets tend to 
be formed in unstable and highly conflictual political systems, emerging when 
everything else has failed. These arguments were not confirmed and other rese­
arch was continued. Two British scholars [Herman, Pope 1973] in a well know 
article dem onstrated that m inority governm ents were more comm on than 
previously assumed (constituting 36 percent o f governments in their cross­
-national data set). They also suggested five main reasons for this phenomenon. 
First, a substantial proportion o f the minority governments they studied were 
caretaker administrations, which typically came to power as a result o f  some 
sort o f crisis and were deliberatively established for only a short period o f time. 
Second, sometimes m inority governments took office because one or more 
coalition partners withdrew from m ajority coalitions. Third, a few minority 
governments came to office because elections that usually provided one party 
with a legislative majority surprisingly ended with no party winning a m ajo­
rity o f seats and, typically, a new election was soon announced. Fourth, mino­
rity cabinets arose because extreme parties on either side o f the political spec­
trum were not credible, reliable, formal coalition partners for parties closer 
to the center. Fifth, and probably the m ost interesting in this context, some 
m inority cabinets were formed in situations in which one o f the parties fell 
only a few seats short o f a legislative majority. Often in such cases, the domi­
nant party formed a one-party minority government and usually did so with the 
formal support o f one o f the smaller parties.
Strom argues that the study o f government coalition formation would 
benefit considerably i f  the stress on structural factors that has dominated for 
m any years is com plem ented by an analysis o f  behaviorial factors, which 
were underdeveloped in the analysis. Minority government formation cannot 
be explained unless political parties are understood as something other than 
pure short-term office seekers. It is also true that one set o f assumptions does 
not fit all parties, because some o f them are more office oriented, others more 
concerned about the pursuit o f  votes or policy. M inority governm ents are 
the m ost probably to be formed where parties value votes and policy highly 
compared to office. Only by taking into account the intraparty organizational 
explanations o f differences in party objectives and party behavior -  aptly 
summarized under the headings o f office-seeking, vote-seeking, and policy­
-seeking -  will it be possible to reach a comprehensive understanding of govern­
ment formationprocesses [Strom 1990: 242-43],
In the post-w ar period till the 1973, the Danish party system was a 
traditional unidim ensional Scandinavian party system w ith a large Social 
Democratic Party, one or two small Communist or Socialist parties to the left o f 
it, and three centre-right parties to the right o f it. After December 1973 elections
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this stable system was changed seriously by adding entirely new elements to 
the party system, by changing its overall configuration, and by gradually letting 
the parties -  new and old -  find their places in either the central or peripheral 
parts ofthe  party system [Bille 1997: 382, 387],
It is also necessary to notice that Danish model o f party organization has 
traditionally been membership-oriented. The goal o f creating and maintaining 
membership structures was to establish stable means by which voters could 
announce their interests and viewpoints to party representatives in national, 
regional and local governments, to mobilize and encapsulate the voters and 
to create a stable source o f party income. During the first half o f the twentieth 
century, parties’ legitimacy and representativeness came to rest more and more 
upon their ability to form -  and maintain -  strong membership organizations. 
The four old parties -  the Social Democratic Party (1871), the Social Liberal 
Party (1905), the Liberal Party (1870) and the Conservative People’s Party 
(gradually developed since the mid-1870s, renamed in 1915) -  perceived them­
selves as the prime representative organizations o f the people. The same stra­
tegy was used by newly established parties -  the Socialist People’s Party (1959), 
the Christian People’s Party (1970), the Progress Party (1972), the Centre 
Democrats (1973), the R ed-G reen Alliance (1990) and the Danish People’s 
Party (1995) -  which dominated the party system in Denmark. Typical habit 
which can be noticed among all Danish parties whether old or young, left or 
right, secular or Christian, large or small is that they make a formal distinc­
tion betw een the parliam entary party and the membership party. The latter 
is made up o f local branches, constituency organizations, regional organiza­
tions, a national conference and national executives organized along mainly 
hierarchical lines. They also perceive themselves as representative parties, and 
all attach a great deal o f importance to having the individual party members 
represented in the leading party bodies. These activities result in a relatively 
high degree o f organizational stability, which is unfortunately not seen in the 
number o f party members. On the basis o f collected data it is known that the 
individual membership of the Danish political parties has decreased from a total 
o f about 615,000 in I960 to about 180,000 in 2000 or from around 22 percent 
o f the electorate in I960 to less than 5 percent in 2000 [Pedersen, Bille, Buch, 
Elklit, Hansen, Nielsen 2004: 367-368]
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Rules on the Formation and Termination o f Governments in 
Denmark
The Danish Constitution does not say much on the government forma­
tion in a positive way. We can only read that the monarch formally appoints the 
prime minister and other ministers. It is formally the king or queen, which in 
practice means the prime minister, to determine the number o f ministers and 
their portfolios. But the constitution clearly explains that no minister can remain 
in office if  he or she has received a motion of no confidence passed by Folketing 
(parliament) -  see Section 15 (2). If  this kind o f no confidence motion concerns 
the prime minister, the government m ust resign or call elections. A govern­
ment that has received such a motion or has submitted a resignation request for 
other reasons, functions as caretaker cabinet until a new government has been 
formed. There is also one important additional habit that was developed during 
many years o f constitutional practice -  although the constitution is silent on this 
matter -  government interpreted a rejection o f its budget proposal as a vote of 
no confidence [Damgaard 2006: 237],
In Denmark if  election results do not make the choice o f new govern­
ment obvious, the monarch meets with leaders o f all parties to get their advice, 
and can appoint an informateur to negotiate with parties and report back within 
a set time frame. An informateur is usually a seasoned politician with credibi­
lity and standing who is not a prospective Prime Minister. They meet with all 
parties, facilitate preparation o f a coalition agreement, report regularly to the 
media, and recommend to the Queen on either the best form ateur or that there 
should be another informateur round. Once the formateur is identified he or she 
is responsible for the more detailed negotiations required to form a government.
The constitutional mechanism of government creation is generally consi­
dered instrumental in securing minority government formation and survival, 
because on the one hand it “allows governments to seek their support from diffe­
rent quarters for different issues” [Pesonen, Thomas 1983: 83] and on the other 
it does not require the government or the premier-designate at any point in time 
to command a positive majority in parliament -  as long as a majority against the 
government (or the premier-designate) has not been registered. In a fragmented 
parliament (Folketing isjust a good example especially since the early 1970s) this 
leaves ample room for manipulating, and there is no doubt that this constitutional 
arrangement contributes substantially to the ability o f Danish minority govern­
ments to survive and also to build legislative majority coalitions [Elklit 1999: 66],
Crucial element o f the political system in Denmark is the gradual deve­
lopment o f a set of informal rules, which has coped with the vacuum left by the 
Constitution. The presented below set o f informal rules has been summarized
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by Erik Dam gaard on the basis o f Tage K aarsted’s work [Damgaard 1992; 
Kaarsted 1988: 12ff., 91], Six such rules which can also make the government 
formation process rather complicated are the following:
(1)If uncertainty about the appointment o f a new government arises, 
each party will have to give its advice to the crown.
(2)If the advice o f the parties unambiguously points towards a majority 
government -  or a minority government supported by a majority -  
the crown has to follow this advice.
(3)If no majority can be found, the most viable minority must be found.
(4)The interpretation o f the advice o f the parties is the responsibility o f 
the acting prime minister, not the crown.
(5)During the opening phases o f the process, a royal informateur may be 
appointed.
(6)The advice given by the parties is not subject to specific rules or 
norms in regard to its framing or wording.
W hen parties in the system start the play according to the mentioned 
rules, the game can become quite complicated. But the rules nevertheless 
constrain the behavior o f parties in the government formation process, which is 
not a freestyle bargaining exercise. It is clear that such rules establish a proce­
dure that allows and requires all parties, at one or several stages, to announce 
their government preferences to the public at a formal visit to the monarch. 
As it was also stated before the prime minister is described in the constitution 
as a subject that has a prerogative to dissolve the Folketing at almost any time, 
which o f course has a great impact on coalition bargaining. There is only one 
exception when an incoming government is forbidden to call elections before it 
has appeared before the Folketing. To sum up two main institutional rules with 
respect to government formation and termination are the following: (1) the right 
o f a parliamentary majority to censure the government and (2) the right o f the 
prime minister to dissolve parliament. Both o f them are used in Denmark and 
their importance is greater than can be deduced from the frequency o f their 
application in the real political life [Damgaard 2006: 238],
Government Formation in Denmark -  the Case Studies
Processes o f government formation in minority situations may be quite 
complex. Several parties interact, and each tries to attain the best possible 
outcome given other players’ preferences and actions. Party leaders and their 
more-or-less fractionalised party groups may be motivated by short-term as well 
as long-term goals. Governmental office sometimes is an end in itself, but most 
politicians seek office as a means to affect policy decisions and legislation or to
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influence their electoral fortunes. Evidently, entering government and obtaining 
government portfolios is the fundamental way to satisfy office-seeking motiva­
tions. However, policy-seeking and vote-seeking parties under some circum­
stances may find that they can achieve as m uch in opposition as in govern­
ment. In general, parties will be more inclined to seek office i f  the net benefits 
o f governing outweigh the net benefits o f being in opposition. Government 
participation almost always increases the policy influence o f a party, but the 
extra influence normally comes with an electoral cost. According to analysis 
it is clear that forming governments in Denmark in the postwar period was not 
a light procedure. O f the thirty-one-cabinets formed only six were really majo­
rity coalitions, so it means that participating parties were controlling an abso­
lute majority o f seats in the Folketing (years o f formation 1957, I960, 1968, 
1993), whereas a further eleven cabinets were minority coalitions. Quite intri­
guing was the situation in I960, 1962, 1978 when minority coalitions were 
extremely close to having majority status and actually functioned as majority 
governments in many respects. The rest fourteen cabinets were o f the single­
-party minority type, but lots o f them (especially formed in 1945, 1953, 1955, 
1966 and 1971) was very stable with support from opposition parties in legisla­
tive majority building, at least for a two-years period. It must be also noted that 
ten o f the seventeen coalition cabinets were built by parties located closely to 
each other on the left-right scale. There was only one exception when Social 
Democratic -  Liberal coalition o f 1978-1979 was formed to create working 
majority in order to cope with the economic problems of the country. Next four 
coalitions in 1980s do not quite conform to the party locations on the scale and 
it was caused by the Centre Democrats were considered more ‘leftist’ than the 
Radical Liberals (1982, 1984, 1987). There also can be observed another rule in 
the cabinet formation connected with small parties. It occurred that small centre 
parties have usually been able to choose coalition partners to their left (Social 
Democrats) and to their right (Conservatives and Liberals) as they thought expe­
dient. They were a great example o f relevant parties [Damgaard 2006: 239],
In the Table no. 1 it is presented the complicated process o f govern­
ment formation, which parties were involved in it, how long the process lasted. 
There is also presented the duration o f the cabinet and its strength in the Danish 
parliament.
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Tablel. Government formation, duration and strength in Denmark 1945-2015
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Lib 1945 7 1 SD, RL, Lib, Con 8 720 38 149
SD 1947 6 2 (1)SD, RL, Lib, Con (2)Lib 16 1027 58 150
SD 1950 6 1 SD, RL, JP 11 40 60 151
Lib-Con 1950 6 0 4 904 60 151
Lib-Con 1953 6 0 0 154 60 151
SD 1953 7 0 8 486 75 179
SD-RL-JP 1957 7 1 SD, RL, JP, Lib, Con 14 997 94 179
SD-RL I960 7 0 3 654 88 179
SD 1964 6 1 SD, RL, Lib, Con 4 787 77 179
SD 1966 6 0 0 427 70 179
RL-Lib-Con 1968 6 0 10 1327 98 179
SD 1971 5 1 SD, RL, Lib, Con 20 360 71 179
Lib 1973 10 1 all parties 15 386 22 179
SD 1975 10 3
(1) All parties except Con, LS
(2) SD, RL, CD, CPP, Con
(3) Con, Lib, CD, CPP, PP
35 733 54 179
SD 1977 11 0 0 561 66 179
SD-Lib 1978 11 0 26 419 88 179
SD 1979 10 0 3 774 69 179
SD 1981 9 1 all parties 22 247 60 179
Con-Lib-CD-CPP 1982 9 1 all parties 7 487 66 179
Con-Lib-CD-CPP 1984 9 0 0 1337 78 179
Con-Lib-CD-CPP 1987 8 0 2 243 70 179
Con-Lib-RL 1988 8 2 all parties SD, RL, Lib, Con 24 922 68 179
Con-Lib 1990 8 0 6 759 60 179
SD-RL-CD-CPP 1993 8 0 10 604 91 179
SD-RL-CD 1994 8 0 6 825 76 179
SD-RL 1996 8 0 0 436 71 179
SD-RL 1998 10 0 0 1312 71 179
Lib-Con 2001 12 0 6 1208 72 179
Lib-Con 2005 11 0 5 985 70 179
Lib-Con 2007 12 0 7 469 64 179
Lib-Con 2009 12 0 0 905 64 179
SD-RL-SPP 2011 12 0 15 854 77 179
SD-RL 2014 12 0 0 511 61 179
Lib 2015 13 0 8 from28.06.2015 34 179
Abbreviations:
LS-LeftSocialist;SPP-SocialistPeople’sParty;SD-SocialDemocrats;CD-CentreDemocrats; 
RL -  Radical Liberals; CPP -  Christian People’s Party; JP -  Justice Party; Con -  Conservatives; 
Lib -  Liberals; PP -  Progress Party.
Source: Own study based on information from Folketing [http://www.thedanishparliament.dk] 
and [Damgaard 2006: 234-235, 240, 242],
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Whenever a government has resigned for whatever reason, the formation 
attempts start to form a new one. ‘Private’ inter-party discussions and nego­
tiations are not officially presented to public opinion and such bargaining or 
talks are very often conducted in addition to and frequently simultaneously 
with the official rounds o f cabinet formation bargaining. Sometimes the change 
o f government is fast and can be rather named as ‘technical’. In the table no. 
1 there are some examples conhrming cabinets were formed within zero days. 
We can also see that the average time required for formation can be classi- 
hed in tree types: short-time (5 days) or medium-time (13 days) and long-time 
(25 days) [Damgaard 2006: 241, 243],
For researchers analyzing minority governments one factor is very intere­
sting too -  it is durability o f such cabinets. For Danish case it is worth noting that 
durability o f such cabinets does not differ extremely to majority governments. 
Obviously, it is visible that relatively short duration o f these governments reflects 
the vulnerability o f minority cabinets without stable support, on the one hand, 
and the prerogative o f the cabinet to dissolve parliament, on the other. There is 
also a difference between one-party minority governments and those formed by 
coalitions. On average, one-party governments sit for two-and-a-half years.
Elections 2015 and the Weakest Government in Denmark?
According to the Danish Constitution, the election was planned no later 
than 15 September 2015, since the last election was held on 15 September 
2011. The Prime M inister was able to call the election at any date, provided 
it is no later than four years from the previous election. Although the Social 
Democrats increased their share o f the vote and won more seats, the “Blue” 
opposition bloc led by Venstre’s Rasmussen (Venstre, Danish People’s Party, 
Liberal Alliance, Conservative People’s Party, and Christian Democrats) gained 
a parliam entary m ajority over the “Red” Social Dem ocrat-led bloc (Social 
Democrats, Red-Green Alliance, The Alternative, Social Liberals, and Socialist 
People’s Party). Within an hour of the election result being declared, prime mini­
ster Helle Thoming-Schmidt announced her government would step down on 
19 June 2015. After 18 June 2015 elections Denmark faced its weakest govern­
ment in four decades after talks to form a rightwing coalition finally collapsed 
and the Liberals pledged to govern alone, even though they took less than 20% at 
last week’s general election. The failure o f the right to reach agreement presents 
the Liberals with a stark choice: to rely on the centre-left Social Democrats, 
the biggest party in parliament, to push through legislation or, more likely, to lean 
on the anti-immigrant Danish People’s party, the country’s second largest force, 
which has succeeded in the past 15 years in shifting Danish politics markedly
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to the right. After a meeting o f the four rightwing party bosses on 26 June 2015, 
Liberal leader Lars Lokke Rasmussen toldjoum alists that it was his assessment 
after the evening’s discussion that it would be possible to form a Liberal govern­
ment under his leadership, which would enjoy support in parliament. Rasmussen, 
a former prime minister, had only 34 seats out o f 179 in Denmark’s parliament, 
so would depend on winning the support o f at least 56 other MPs in order to 
pass any legislation. Through public speeches Rasmussen demonstrated his great 
awareness because a pure Liberal government was no tju st a minority govern­
ment, but a very small minority government. A long history of minority coalition 
governments shows that the defeated centre-left administration of prime minister 
Helle Thoming-Schmidt depended frequently on Liberal support over the past 
four years. However, it was more than four decades since a cabinet had fewer 
seats: Liberal leader Poul Hartling held office from 1973-1975 with only 22 but 
his administration lastedjust 14 months. However Thoming-Schmidt’s Social 
Democrats won elections and took 47 seats on a higher proportion o f the vote, 
but her coalition partners suffered badly and she quit as party leader on elec­
tion night. The main election winner was the populist DPP (Danish People’s 
Party), which became D enm ark’s second largest party w ith more than 21% 
o f the vote. The DPP set out four conditions for their involvement in a coali­
tion: a Eurosceptic approach to the EU, the re-introduction o f border controls, 
further restrictions on imm igration and asylum policy, and 0.8% growth in 
public spending. But despite attempts by the Liberals to coax him into a coali­
tion, DPP leader Kristian Thulesen Dahl has opted to wield the party’s influence 
from the sidelines and prop up the Liberals on a vote-by-vote basis. Even with 
the support o f almost all the rightwing parties (the Conservative People’s Party 
indicated they would rather stay out o f a government coalition), the Liberals will 
have the slimmest o f majorities in parliament -  just one vote -  at a time when 
Denmark’s economic recovery is still tentative. The currency has come under 
pressure and the central bank has embarked on a radical experiment with nega­
tive interest rates. Some political analyst from Denmark’s political scene claims 
that the DPP in many cases will seek cooperation with the Social Democrats and 
perhaps even the left, because as Dahl declared he considers him self to be half 
red and half blue and it can make life difficult for Rasmussen as prime minister, 
but not necessarily impossible. While the DPP has pushed to the reintroduction of 
strict border controls to prevent movement o f migrants, Rasmussen promised to 
maintain Denmark’s status as a member o f the Schengen group of nations which 
has no internal borders [Crouch 2015],
The fundam ental question is does the R asm ussen cabinet m anage 
to m aintain for a long period o f time and does the duration o f it will get an 
average for this kind o f governments? Finding an answer to this question is now
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impossible, but the situation is quite extraordinary. The weakest government 
from four decades is now the great object to be observed and analysed and the 
main aim o f researchers is now to collect arguments confirming old theories 
about minority cabinets formation in the context o f party behavior.
Conclusions
The discussion o f the behavior o f Danish political parties and its influ­
ence on cabinet formation and durability led us into the following conclusions. 
The large number o f parties in the Danish multi-party system order them se­
lves rather nicely on a basic socio-economic left-right scale. All o f them prefer 
having policy influence and obtaining cabinet positions. The inter-party game 
on government formation is conducted according to formal and informal rules. 
The bargaining among parties on the form ation o f governm ents has been 
completed comparatively swiftly, with the small centre parties playing crucial 
role in the party system. In the huge majority o f cases, the result has been mino­
rity governments which mainly have been formed by coalitions of parties rather 
than by separate single party.
Denmark has strong parliaments, which mean that parties in opposition 
have considerable decision making clout. Participation in government is not 
necessary to gain influence, and, as a result, m inority governments become 
more likely. Another significant feature of the party system which also influence 
government formation is the structure o f party system. Minority governments 
are more likely in systems with one centrally-located, relatively large party. 
Such a pattern has been visible in many Scandinavian countries for decades but 
is currently eroding at least in Denmark.
Government coalition parties in Denmark have not developed the model 
o f signing formal, public agreements to any noticeable extend. They rather 
prefer making deals in more subtle way which cover the real internal negotia­
tions among politicians. There are also weakly visible stable norms on coalition 
governance that developed over many years and detecting these rules is some­
thing difficult for observers.
In the models of competitive party behavior o f the rational choice tradition 
vote-seeking at future elections has been an important objective for some parties 
on some occasions in Denmark. The instrumental character of vote maximization 
(or satisficing) for either policy pursuit or office-seeking (or both) has been mani­
fested. Office-seeking has been an essential, evident, and frequent party objective.
However the termination o f governments was not analyzed in the article, 
but it is caused on the one hand by technical reasons, and on the other by indi­
vidual strategy o f the party. Danish cabinets sometimes decide to call early
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elections three to six months before the end o f the term without any serious 
reasons like e.g. developing conflict on the political scene. If  potential conflict 
starts to grow, term ination either happen because m inority governments are 
defeated in parliament or because they try to improve their bargaining position 
through earlier elections [Damgaard 2006: 260-261],
To sum up the Danish parliam entary system is far from formalities, 
flexible and innovative with respect to coalition governance. There is a noticeable 
habit that when a formal majority coalitions is unwilling among the parties, then 
a minority cabinet is appointed instead with an obligation to perform extremely 
complex majority structure for decisionmaking [Damgaard, Svensson 1989], 
The last government founded in June 2015 is now one o f the weakest 
minority cabinets in Denmark. Will it confirm the tendencies described above or 
will be an example o f new processes, it is hard to predict now. One thing is sure 
the stable model o f government formation and party behavior has been mainta­
ined in Denmark and is a good example for other democratic states seeking an 
effective model o f governing .
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